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Abstract
Existing findings suggest that standard, frictionless, expected-utility models have
difficulty accounting for average and for median holdings of wealth and of risky assets,
partly as a result of the largely unexplained limited proportion of stockholders among
households. We analyze life-cycle wealth accumulation and portfolio choice under
career uncertainty and quantifiable departures from expected utility maximization. Our
specification nests expected utility and three types of non-expected utility: (i) Kreps-
Porteus preferences that disentangle risk aversion from elasticity of substitution, (ii)
Yaari’s Dual Theory of Choice, and (iii) Quiggin’s Rank-dependent Utility.
Specifications (ii) and (iii) exhibit “first-order” risk aversion and kinked indifference
curves. Solution of such models under multiple sources of risk presents conceptual and
computational difficulties. We introduce a notion of equilibrium and a computational
algorithm appropriate for such setups. Computed wealth and stockholding, based on
calibrated income processes for three education categories, are compared to the 1992
Survey of Consumer Finances. Rank-dependent utility enhances the importance of
precautionary effects. Contrary to priors in the literature, solutions are not typically at
kinks; neither kinks nor actual solutions involve zero stockholding when income risk is
recognized; and yet predictions about average wealth and risky assets tend to improve
for all education categories. Mere disentangling of risk aversion from elasticity has
small effects, while dual theory predictions are farther from the data and the signs of
precautionary effects are reversed.
Keywords: Precautionary saving, non-expected utility, stockholding, household
portfolios.
JEL classification codes: G11, E21.









During the past decade, financial markets have experienced a policy-induced move
towards greater liberalization, product innovation, and international integration.
Privatization of public utilities and the proliferation of mutual funds, both aided by
aggressive advertising, served to broaden the stockholder base. The propensity of
households to undertake financial risk, i.e. the emergence of an “equity culture”, is of
prime importance for successful privatization, absorption of new financial products,
and avoidance of stock market thinness. It is similarly important for whether
households take advantage of the prospects that EMU generates for increased asset
holding across international borders. Household preferences and optimal portfolio
composition over the life cycle are also at the center of the policy debate on the design
and regulation of private pension systems.
Despite its importance, little is known about household portfolio behavior and
about how different preference structures interact with other characteristics to
determine whether risky assets are held and in which proportion. This is partly due to
the fact that “precautionary” saving and portfolio models that allow for background
labor income risk, do not admit analytical solutions except in the highly restrictive case
of exponential utility.
1 The issue is of academic and policy interest given the multitude
of new and potential stockholders, their varied educational backgrounds, earnings
prospects, and attitudes towards risk and intertemporal substitution of consumption.
Existing findings suggest that the standard, frictionless, expected-utility model has
difficulty accounting for average and median holdings of wealth and of risky assets,
partly as a result of the largely unexplained limited proportion of stockholders (see
King and Leape, 1984; Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995,2
Poterba and Samwick, 1995; Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzesse, 1996; Attanasio, Banks,
and Tanner, 1998; Bertaut, 1998).
It has been suggested in the literature that departures from expected utility, and
in particular preferences that yield kinked indifference curves as a result of “first-order
risk aversion” (see Segal and Spivak, 1990), could account for the limited incidence of
stockholding and thus improve predictions about average portfolio composition.
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Based on the literature, our priors were that: (i) setups with first-order risk aversion
would typically yield solutions at “kinks” on indifference curves; (ii) these kinks would
involve zero stockholding; and (iii) this would bring model predictions closer to the
data. In this paper, we find that (i) solutions in such setups are not typically at kinks;
(ii) neither kinks nor actual solutions involve zero stockholding when income risk is
recognized; and yet (iii) predictions about average wealth and risky asset holdings
improve. In the process, we chart portfolio behavior for a variety of preference
specifications.
We solve numerically a large number of small-scale models of household
portfolio choice that employ a general, constant relative risk aversion preference
specification, under various assumptions about the earnings process. Our preference
specification nests expected utility and three types of departures from expected utility
(“non-expected utility”) in a way that makes them quantifiable. These are: (i) Kreps-
Porteus preferences that, unlike expected utility, disentangle risk aversion from
intertemporal substitution (as in Attanasio and Weber, 1989; Epstein, 1990; Weil,
1990; Campbell, 1993; Restoy and Weil, 1996); (ii) Quiggin’s (1982) “Rank-
dependent Utility” which overweights inferior outcomes relative to expected utility;
and (iii) Yaari’s (1987) “Dual Theory of Choice”, which also overweights inferior
outcomes but imposes piecewise linearity of indifference curves. Specifications (ii) and3
(iii) involve “kinked” indifference curves. Solutions show how long-run precautionary
motives of households facing career risk interact with life-cycle considerations to
determine saving and portfolios. Career risk is calibrated for three education classes
(high-school dropouts, high-school graduates, and college graduates), and solutions
are compared to portfolio data from the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances.
The combination of background income risk and stockholding risk under rank-
dependent utility and under dual-theory preferences presents a conceptual and
technical challenge. The ranking of states in terms of desirability depends in general on
individual choices (such as the level of risky investment). Optimal choices depend in
turn on the conjectured ranking of states, since the latter determines the objective
function to be maximized. Reversals in rankings generate points of nondifferentiability
of the objective function (“kinks”), where the usual first-order conditions cannot be
used to derive solutions. The presence of multiple sources of uncertainty makes it
difficult to ascertain such reversal points a priori. We introduce a notion of conjectural
equilibrium for models where the ranking of outcomes matters and there are multiple
sources of uncertainty, and a corresponding computational algorithm that allows for
solutions at unknown points of nondifferentiability of the objective function.
Section II presents the preferences nested by our specification, introduces our
notion of conjectural equilibrium, and describes the computational algorithm. Section
III describes the saving-portfolio model. Section IV discusses calibration. Section V
derives effects of each departure from expected utility on optimal saving and
portfolios, including precautionary effects. It also examines the sensitivity of results to
alternative assumptions about risk aversion, elasticity of substitution, the variance and
persistence of earnings shocks, their correlation with stock returns, and the presence of
bequest motives. Section VI compares predictions to data. Section VII concludes.9
likely that solutions will involve tangency between the budget line and the indifference
curve, despite the presence of the kink.
II.3.3 Conjectural Equilibria and Computational Algorithm
Our notion of conjectural equilibrium and its computational counterpart apply
when the ranking of states matters for the functional form of the objective, and the
agent chooses the amount of risky investment to maximize this function. At particular
levels of risky investment, the ranking of states changes, thus altering the objective
function. The resulting nondifferentiability of the objective function at those levels is
manifested in “kinked” indifference curves.
For purposes of graphical illustration, consider a simple two-dimensional case
(Fig.1) analogous to that in Segal and Spivak (1990) and in Epstein and Zin (1990), in
which the household faces only stockholding risk but not background income risk. The
two states of the world defined by the high and low realizations of stock returns are
states 1 and 2 respectively. Consumption bundles under the 45
o line result from
positive stockholding, since they involve higher consumption in the high- rather than in
the low-stock-return state.  Those above the 45
o line are associated with short sales of
stock, while the line itself contains combinations facing a non-stockholder.
The two indifference curves shown intersect, because each reflects different
conjectured rankings of outcomes. The curve through point A incorporates the
conjecture that state 1 is better than 2 (or equivalently that optimal stockholding is
positive). It has a valid (solid) segment under the 45° line, namely where conjectured
and actual rankings coincide. Above the line, stockholding is negative and the
conjecture is not valid (dotted segment). The other curve incorporates the conjecture
that state 2 is better, which is valid above the line. They intersect on the 45
o line,
because the two states are identical and their relative weights are irrelevant for utility.10
Our notion of equilibrium and computational algorithm essentially exploit the
observation that kinked indifference curves in rank-dependent utility can be thought of
as consisting of the valid (solid) segments of smooth, everywhere differentiable
indifference curves. In solving the problem, the household (or the computer
programmer) need not know a priori the location of kinks. It simply conjectures a
ranking of states, picking the family of (ordinary) indifference curves to consider. It
then chooses controls to maximize its utility under the conjecture (i.e., it finds the point
of tangency between the budget line and a curve in this family). Once the point is
found, the ranking of states is compared to the conjecture. Conjectural equilibrium
occurs when they coincide. In Fig. 1, this happens at a point of tangency with the
budget line.
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In Fig. 2, equilibrium is at a kink. In this case, conjectures postulating an
inferior state are not confirmed, since neither B nor C lie on a valid segment. The
household then considers “ties” between the ambiguous states. The “kink” which
maximizes utility and confirms the conjectured tie is point A.
This equilibrium notion has a natural computational counterpart. First, each
objective function defined by a particular conjecture is maximized, ignoring the fact
that it holds only for a subset of values of risky investment. The resulting rankings of
states are then compared to the conjectures. If all conjectures not involving ties fail,
then the solution lies at a point of nondifferentiability that violates the FOC for risky
investment. The offending FOC is replaced by the requirement that the tied states yield
the same utility. The model is solved, and the ranking is checked against the
conjecture.
5 In typical problems with unique solutions, the process stops once an
equilibrium is found. Judicious choice of the sequence of conjectures minimizes
computation time.12
IV. Calibration
IV. 1 Rates of Return
The twenty-year riskless rate is compounded using the Mehra-Prescott (1985)
historical mean annual riskless rate. Calibration of cumulative stock returns is based on a
binomial model of annual stock returns which matches the first two moments of the long-
run empirical return distribution estimated by Mehra and Prescott (1985).
 Stock returns can
take a high or low value equal to the expected value plus or minus (respectively) the
standard deviation of 20-year holding returns, when both moments are computed from the
binomial process for annual returns. Following Haliassos (1994), expected dividend yields
are set to about half the expected total pre-tax return on equity, which is consistent with the
historical findings of Schwert (1990). We first consider the case of no correlation between
income and stock returns, and no retirement income risk, as also in Hubbard, Skinner and
Zeldes (1994). This gives us four second-period and eight third-period states. Each set
consists of equiprobable states in the absence of correlation between incomes and stock
returns. We then examine the cases of positive and negative correlation between second-
period labor incomes and stock returns. Nonzero correlation is induced while still matching
means and standard deviations, by using the same second-period income and return
realizations as in the no-correlation case but abandoning the assumption that they are
equiprobable.
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IV. 2 Labor Incomes
Income calibration follows Bertaut and Haliassos (1997). Our measure of labor
income is the present value of earnings over a twenty-year interval. Earnings processes and
age-earnings profiles are assumed to depend on the level of education. We distinguish
between those with (i) less that high-school education (LS), (ii) high-school education
(HS), and (iii) at least a college degree (CL). In our end-of-period model, we start looking13
at households after their first (twenty-year) period earnings have been realized. Households
are still faced with risk regarding human capital returns in the second half of their career
that depends on their education level. This risk affects their first period saving and portfolio
choices. As in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994, 1995), however, households are
assumed to face no uncertainty regarding the pension income available to their educational
category. The model is kept small by abstracting also from health risks in old age.
7
While it would be possible to make assumptions directly on twenty-year incomes,
we prefer to derive those for different underlying properties of annual incomes. The annual
earnings process consists of the deterministic age-earnings profile, and of stochastic
processes followed by persistent and transitory income shocks. It is impossible to estimate
all components from the cross sectional data in the 1992 SCF that contains the detailed
portfolio data. Instead, we calibrate age-earnings profiles for each education category from
the SCF, and use the stochastic processes for (multiplicative) permanent and transitory
income shocks estimated by Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994) from panel data in the
PSID. Since we are interested in model comparisons and precautionary effects, we employ
adjustments introduced by Bertaut and Haliassos (1997) to ensure that present-value
measures of labor income in models without income risk are equal to expected incomes
under career uncertainty, and to average population incomes computed from the data.
Age-earnings profiles represent total annual labor income in models without income
risk, and the deterministic component of income in models with income risk. We compute
mean annual incomes for each age-education cell in the SCF, based on reported population
weights, and we use them to compute twenty-year present values.
8 Since present values
may be hard to interpret, we report them as annual incomes that, if received each year
over a twenty-year period, would yield these present values. For high-school dropouts,14
scaled down age-earnings profiles for the three periods of life are (Y1, Y2, Y3)=
(15019, 21570, 13633), for high-school graduates (25920, 37583, 22032), and for
college graduates (39483, 75527, 49663). Note that they all peak in the second half of
working life, and that this hump is likely to induce young households to borrow in
order to smooth consumption intertemporally.
Income risk is introduced as lognormally distributed, multiplicative stochastic
shocks to annual incomes. We consider persistent shocks, Ut, and transitory shocks, Vt. To
a first approximation, an annual income realization in models with income risk is equal to
the annual income under certainty times the product of the two earnings shocks.
9 The
logarithms of the earnings shocks, denoted by lower case letters, follow the processes
estimated by Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994):
LTHS,t LTHS,t-1 LTHS,t LTHS,t LTHS,t
HS,t HS,t-1 HS,t HS,t HS,t
COL,t COL,t-1 COL,t COL,t COL,t
u  =  0.955u +e ,  e i.i.d. N(0,0.033),  v N(0,0.04)
   
u  =  0.946 u +e ,  e i.i.d. N(0,0.025),  v N(0,0.021)
   




   (16)
According to these estimates, higher educational categories experience lower variances
of labor income shocks, but all experience high serial correlation for persistent shocks.
We examine below the sensitivity of results to alternative assumptions regarding shock
variances and persistence. This seems worthwhile, in view of the difficulties in
disentangling uncertainty from heterogeneity in microeconometric studies.
Since the income measure is the twenty-year present value of incomes and its
analytical moments are not readily computed from assumptions on annual income
shocks, we stochastically generate time series of annual incomes (for ages 40 to 59)15
and compute their present value. We thus construct 20,000 present value realizations
for each education level and compute their mean and standard deviation. The “high”
and “low” labor income values used equal the expected present value plus or minus
one standard deviation, respectively. If Yt refers to income in period t,, while h and l
refer to the high and low income states respectively, then the benchmark income
figures under labor income risk are the following. For high-school dropouts, (Y1, Y2h,
Y2l, Y3) equals (15019, 30088.5, 13219.5, 13633), for high-school graduates, (25920,
48691, 26219, 22032), while for college graduates, (39483, 96010, 55338, 49663).
IV. 3 Parameters
The model contains four important parameters: a, g, r, l. Attitudes towards risk
are controlled by a, equal to one minus the degree of relative risk aversion. Our
“benchmark” value for relative risk aversion is 3, which is often used for representative-
agent models. We solve all model variants for risk aversion between 2 and 10, viewed by
Mehra and Prescott (1985) as the relevant range given the size of the stockholding
“gamble”. Dual Theory preferences entail relative risk aversion of 0.
Overweighting of inferior outcomes is governed by g ˛ (0,1], the power to which
the probability of the worst state is raised. The smaller the g, the greater is household
concern with bad states. Our benchmark model with overweighting postulates g=0.5, but
we have traced the effects of values 1, 0.9, 0.7, 0.5, and 0.15.
Parameter r governs the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the latter being
equal to (1-r)
-1. The benchmark value of r is -3, but we have also examined the
sensitivity of results to values -9, -5 
2/3, -4, -3, and –1, and to a value that corresponds
to elasticity close to unity. The rate of time preference is set at 3.13% per annum,
around the values typically assumed, matching Siegel’s (1993) estimate for the
historical average riskless rate over a very long horizon. Finally, l is the weight given16
to bequests in final-period utility, with benchmark value of 0.25 that gave plausible
results in Bertaut and Haliassos (1997). We also explore the effects of assuming values
of 0.1 and 0.5, and of abstracting from the bequest motive altogether.
V. Saving and Portfolio Effects of Departures from Expected Utility
Table 1 compares predicted wealth-to-income and stock-to-income ratios (W/Y,
S/Y) and utility gains from having access to stocks, for various degrees of relative risk
aversion and for benchmark values of other parameters. The first set of columns refers to an
expected-utility (EU) model, the second to a Kreps-Porteus specification,
10 and the third to
specifications that assign weights to utilities of outcomes depending on their desirability
ranking. The row for risk aversion of zero in the third set of columns shows predictions
from a Yaari Dual-Theory specification, while the remaining rows refer to rank-dependent
utility models of the Quiggin variety (see Section II.3).
Within each set of columns, the first two (labeled W/Y and S/Y) report wealth- and
stock-to-income ratios at the end of the first period. The portfolio share in risky assets can
be obtained by dividing S/Y by W/Y, yielding S/W (not shown). The next three columns
(labeled Exp(W/Y), Exp(S/Y), Exp(S/W)) report expected second-period wealth- and
stock-to-income ratios, as well as expected portfolio shares of risky assets, all based on
information available in the first period. The last column of each set reports the percentage
increase in utility resulting from having access to stocks. It is obtained by solving a model
where households can only invest in bonds, and comparing lifetime utility to that obtained
under the full portfolio model and the same preference and parameter configuration.
Life-cycle patterns are qualitatively similar across preference specifications.
Households expect to have a higher wealth-to-income ratio in the second half of their
working life than in their first, i.e. Exp(W/Y) is larger than W/Y. The opposite is true of the17
predicted stock-to-income ratio: it is optimal to invest a larger proportion of income in
stocks when young than when middle-aged, in order to take advantage of the equity
premium. For the two less educated categories, the tendency to be a net borrower early on
in life is present over a wider range of risk aversion for Kreps-Porteus (KP) preferences.
However, for low relative risk aversion (less than four), predicted net borrowing is larger in
the expected utility (EU) specification. At risk aversion of 4, the EU and KP frameworks
coincide, since risk aversion happens to be the inverse of the benchmark elasticity of
substitution used in the KP framework (see Section II).
V.1 Disentagling Risk Aversion from Elasticity of Substitution
Comparing EU and KP models, we find that EU models exaggerate the sensitivity
of desired first-period wealth to risk aversion, regardless of education category, while
underplaying this sensitivity in the second period. Under expected utility, increases in risk
aversion are accompanied by reductions in elasticity. In the first period, when the age-
earnings profile creates greater incentives to borrow, the negative effects of reduced
elasticity on borrowing reinforce the increases in wealth-to-income ratios induced by higher
risk aversion. In the second period, when expected wealth and incomes are at their peak,
increased risk aversion reduces expected wealth to income ratios, as shown by the KP
results where elasticity is kept unchanged. The largely stable ratios shown under EU
indicate that reduced elasticity countervails the effect of risk aversion when the household is
at the hump of the age-earnings and wealth profile.
Utility gains from access to stocks under KP preferences are substantial and
relatively close to those under EU, since both are characterized by second-order risk
aversion. For degrees of risk aversion lower (higher) than the cutoff of four, utility gains are18
somewhat higher (lower) for KP households than for expected utility maximizers, because
their optimal stockholding is also higher (lower).
V.2 Introducing Overweighting of Inferior Outcomes
The third set of columns in Table 1 introduces first-order risk aversion by assigning
a weight to the worst outcome larger than its associated probability (see Section II). The
row for zero relative risk aversion corresponds to Yaari preferences (Y). Notice that first-
period optimal stockholding is positive for this preference specification. This is because
piecewise linear indifference curves yield a solution where indifference curves are not
differentiable, and this occurs when utility is equal in the two states where stock returns and
incomes move in opposite directions. Equality is in turn achieved when first-period
stockholding is positive and sufficient to hedge fully against income risk in these two states.
Second-period stockholding for Y preferences is zero as argued in the literature, but only
because pension income is nonstochastic and no hedging requirement exists. Utility gains
from stockholding thus mimic the ranking of first-period stockholding. Wealth-to-income
ratios are lower than in other models, since households borrow more for consumption
smoothing, having eliminated (through stockholding) their background income risk in two
of the four states.
Quiggin (Q) preferences (risk aversion 2 to 10 in the third set of columns) tend to
induce more “conservative” saving and portfolio behavior compared to EU and KP.
Controlling for education and risk aversion, first-period borrowing and stockholding are
lower, but the reduction in borrowing is larger, resulting in higher wealth under Q than
under EU or KP. Expected second-period stockholding is also lower under Q, and so are
expected wealth-to-income ratios except for very low risk aversion under EU. As a result19
of the smaller use of stocks, utility gains from stocks are significantly smaller under Q than
under EU or KP.
Notice that the effects of overweighting are smaller when risk aversion is high. We
have also found that, when overweighting of inferior states is substantial, the importance of
risk aversion for model predictions diminishes.
11 Thus, although risk aversion and
overweighting are distinct attributes of preferences, there seems to be a tradeoff in their
importance for saving and portfolios. The importance of overweighting at low risk aversion
commonly assumed in representative-agent models, suggests that overweighting could have
powerful effects on asset accumulation in a wider class of models, including stochastic
growth models.
V. 3 Implications for Precautionary Motives
This section computes precautionary effects on wealth- and on stock-to-income
ratios by contrasting predictions from comparable models with and without labor income
risk. Since expected labor incomes under income risk are equal to labor incomes received
under certainty, differences in predicted asset-to-income ratios represent precautionary
effects. Table 2 has the same structure as Table 1, except that it reports precautionary
effects under the four preference specifications.
The first set of columns in Table 2 shows precautionary effects for an EU model.
Precautionary wealth accumulation ranges from 7 to 13 percentage points. After a small
drop between risk aversion of 2 and 3, it increases somewhat with the risk aversion
parameter, regardless of education. For any given risk aversion, it is largest for high-school
dropouts who face the largest variances of labor income shocks, and smallest for high-
school graduates who face an intermediate variance size but less shock persistence. First-
period stock-to-income ratios are reduced by background income risk as a consequence of20
“standard risk aversion” (see Kimball, 1993), and their absolute changes are negatively
related to risk aversion.
Effects of income risk need not be confined to periods prior to resolution of
income uncertainty. In dynamic models, decisions taken early in life influence the
evolution of state variables, which in turn affect decisions later on. This can be missed
in atemporal or even two-period saving-portfolio models. In our three-period model,
households face no income risk in the third period, and yet their expected second-
period asset to income ratios are not the same as if they never faced income risk.
We find that the less risk averse expect to reduce their second-period wealth-
to-income ratio (i.e., increase their consumption) relative to its level without income
risk. They do so in response to having to hold a precautionary wealth buffer in their
first period of life. The more risk averse, however, expect to continue to hold more
wealth between the second and third period, after income risk has been resolved.
Regardless of risk aversion, a positive effect is also observed for expected stock-to-
income ratios. In all cases, second-period effects of income risk are small.
All qualitative results for EU continue to hold under KP and Q. The relative size of
precautionary effects for EU and KP preferences is ambiguous and depends on risk
aversion. Quiggin preferences yield uniformly larger precautionary wealth and stockholding
effects than EU and KP in the first period of life.
Yaari preferences reverse the direction of precautionary effects in the first period
and the effects of income risk on expected second-period wealth-to-income ratios. Income
risk encourages not only first-period stockholding, but also borrowing to finance the
purchase of stocks and higher current consumption, resulting in lower financial net worth.21
This occurs because the piecewise linearity of indifference curves typically induces first-
period solutions to be at a kink. While the kink without income risk occurs at zero
stockholding, as discussed above, the kink under income risk has to occur at positive
stockholding if the household is to be indifferent between the two states in which stock
returns and incomes move in opposite directions. Thus, the first-period precautionary effect
on stocks is positive. The absence of income risk in the third period means that second-
period stockholding is at a kink of zero regardless of whether second-period labor incomes
are risky or not.
Table 3 explores precautionary effects under extreme overweighting of inferior
states (ã= 0.15). Households with Quiggin preferences hold even more precautionary
wealth, and this spills over to the second period. Surprisingly, extreme overweighting
produces small and even positive effects of income risk on stock-to-income ratios. Holding
of stocks that offer an expected return premium is attractive for generating wealth to
overcome the effects of low labor income realizations, even though it detracts from
consumption when stock returns are low. At low risk aversion, the former consideration
overcomes the latter. This positive precautionary effect on stockholding is specific to very
low values of ã. Unreported calibrations for g between 1 and 0.5 confirm that the larger the
degree of overweighting, the more powerful is the negative effect on optimal stockholding,
regardless of whether income is risky. Its size is inversely related to relative risk aversion.
V. 4 The Role of Variance and of Persistence of Income Shocks
Our benchmark income processes are based on econometric estimates of the
stochastic processes for income shocks. Since it is difficult to know how households
perceive their own earnings process and what is included in their information sets22
versus those of econometricians, it is instructive to explore effects of different
assumptions about labor income uncertainty and persistence.
Table 4 shows the same information as Table 1, but for variance of (the logarithm
of) permanent and transitory income shocks 20% higher than the benchmark. Table 5
repeats the exercise, but for variance 20% lower than the benchmark. Incomes are adjusted
to preserve the same expected income regardless of income variance.
Consistent with Section V.3, under EU, KP, and Q preferences, higher
(perceived) variance of income shocks leads to higher first-period wealth- and lower
stock-to-income ratios, while Y preferences have opposite effects. The twenty percent
variations in second-period labor income risk relative to the benchmark do not have
noticeable effects on expected second-period asset-to-income ratios. Of course,
second-period stockholding under Y preferences is at the zero kink in the absence of
third-period income risk. Our qualitative results in Sections V.1 and V.2 regarding
alternative preference specifications appear robust with respect to assumed or perceived
variances of labor income shocks.
Tables 6 and 7 explore changes in persistence, ñY, of labor income shocks
relative to the benchmarks of 0.955 and 0.946, for unchanged variances of income
shocks and mean incomes. Table 6 shows effects of ñY=1, which entails
nonstationarity. The direction of effects of a unit root parallels that of an increase in
the variances of shocks, since both result in greater “career” uncertainty.
Nonstationarity encourages first-period wealth holding and discourages stockholding
relative to the benchmark, except under Y preferences where effects are reversed.
Effects on expected second-period wealth are negligible under EU and KP, but
positive under Q and Y. Interestingly, there seems to be some intertemporal
substitution of stockholding by households faced with permanent income shocks in the23
second period. They decrease first-period stock-to-income ratios but increase second-
period ratios, except under Y preferences where first-period results are reversed and
second-period stockholding is zero. Larger effects are obtained when we halve
persistence to ñY=0.5 (Table 7), but their direction is consistent with Table 6, except
for an ambiguity in expected second-period wealth-to-income ratios.
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Results on effects of persistence and variance of income shocks translate one-
for-one into conclusions regarding relative size of precautionary effects. For example,
if wealth-to-income ratios are larger under greater shock persistence, so is
precautionary wealth. This is because the yardstick against which precautionary effects
are measured is the same, namely a model without labor income risk.
V.5 Correlation between Labor Income Shocks and Stock Returns
Our benchmark assumes zero correlation between labor income shocks and
excess stock returns, as indeed most of the literature to date. We now explore effects
of positive and negative correlation. We use the procedure in Section IV. 1 to induce
positive correlation of 0.2 and then negative correlation of –0.03. Both numbers are in
the range of findings by Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (1998) for economies
without borrowing constraints.
Table 8 shows that positive correlation of 0.2 encourages first-period wealth
holding and discourages stockholding, with one minor exception. In view of the
increased likelihood of combined adverse shocks to incomes and stock returns,
households want to hold more wealth to buffer their consumption and want to limit
their stockholding. The exception is that, under Y preferences, stockholding is at a
“kink” that is unaffected by the induced correlation.
13 Expected second-period asset-
to-income ratios are somewhat lower for all preferences except Y. Effects are small,24
however, especially at higher risk aversion. Utility gains from stockholding are
uniformly smaller under positive covariance than in our benchmark.
Negative correlation of –0.03 enables households to reduce consumption risk
through holding of stocks negatively correlated with labor income (Table 9). We find
more first-period stockholding and borrowing, slightly higher expected second-period
wealth-to-income ratios and hardly noticeable increases in expected stock to income
ratios and utility gains from stockholding. As in the previous Section, results translate
one-for-one into conclusions about precautionary effects.
V. 6 The Role of Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution is constrained to be the inverse of relative
risk aversion in the EU framework. However, under KP, Q, and Y preferences, it is
possible to fix elasticity while varying risk aversion (Section II). In Table 10, we choose
elasticity close to unity (0.95), instead of our benchmark of 0.25. Since households are
more willing to substitute consumption intertemporally, they borrow more to enhance
consumption in the first and second periods of life. Despite this, first-period and expected
second-period stockholding drop considerably. Thus, the purpose of borrowing is to
enhance consumption rather than to take advantage of the equity premium. Since effects on
borrowing reinforce those on stockholding, this high elasticity makes households net
borrowers in both periods for a wide range of degrees of risk aversion. Thus, wealth-to-
income ratios are much more sensitive to elasticity than are stock-to-income ratios,
consistent with the intuition that elasticity matters mostly for wealth accumulation, while
risk aversion governs accumulation of risky assets.
14
Table 11 shows precautionary effects for KP, Q, and Y preferences and elasticity of
0.95.  For brevity, we only show results for high-school dropouts. Under KP and Q
preferences, first-period precautionary wealth holding is about double that under the25
benchmark in Table 2, and reductions in stock-to-income ratios are also larger in absolute
value. Expected second-period wealth-to-income ratios are reduced relative to those under
income certainty. Expected stock-to-income ratios increase more in response to income
risk than under lower elasticity.  Under Y preferences, precautionary wealth-to-income
ratios have the same sign pattern as under the benchmark, but absolute values are larger
when elasticity is high. Elasticity does not alter precautionary effects on stocks, because it
does not affect stockholding levels at kinks where solutions lie, as explained above.
V. 7 The Role of Bequest Motives
So far we have assumed an operative bequest motive. In unreported
experiments, we found that the magnitude of concern about bequests (size of ë) has a
small effect on predicted borrowing and thus on wealth, and negligible effects on
stockholding for our benchmark parameter settings.
15 Still, bequests may be a “luxury
good” operative only for households in certain education categories that enjoy higher
levels of permanent income. In Table 12, we remove the bequest motive altogether. 
In the absence of a bequest motive, households tend to borrow more and to
invest less in stocks than in its presence, whether they maximize expected utility or
they depart from it. This shows that such households shift more consumption through
borrowing towards the first period of life, and they are less concerned about their
future debt burden. Indeed, households of all education categories and degrees of risk
aversion shown are predicted to be net borrowers in their first (but not in their second)
period of life, regardless of the assumption regarding preferences.
16 In addition, since
they lack an incentive to generate wealth for their descendants, they are less willing to
expose themselves to stockholding risk so as to take advantage of the equity premium
in either the first or the second period. As a result, utility gains from stockholding are
also lower in the absence of a bequest motive.. Despite these asset level effects,26
however, our conclusions regarding comparisons across preference specifications
continue to hold.
Table 13 reports precautionary effects for high-school dropouts. Comparison
with Table 2 shows that, under EU, KP, and Q preferences, first-period precautionary
wealth is larger in the absence of bequest motives, and so are expected reductions in
second-period wealth. We do not find very different first-period effects on
stockholding, except under Q preferences, but second-period effects are somewhat
smaller in the absence of a bequest motive. Under Y preferences, there are no
differences in precautionary effects on stockholding, but first-period (negative)
precautionary effects on wealth holding are now larger in absolute value.
VI. Comparison with US Household Behavior
Table 14 compares predictions under EU, Q, and Y preferences to data from the
1992 SCF. The reported “narrow” measure of stocks includes shares of publicly traded
stocks, shares in stock mutual funds, and other “directly held” stocks in IRAs and Keogh
plans. The broader definition includes also stocks held in trusts, managed investment
accounts and defined-contribution pension plans. Riskless assets include checking, saving,
money market, and call accounts, CDs, saving and other bonds, and the cash value of life
insurance, minus credit card balances, consumer loans, and other non-real-estate loans.
Financial net worth corresponding to the broader measure of stocks includes also assets in
managed accounts and defined-contribution pension plans. Average financial net worth and
holdings of stocks are scaled by average “income”, which includes wage and salary income,
income derived from a professional business or practice, unemployment and workers’
compensation payments, and income from Social Security and other pensions. After-tax
labor income from non-retirement sources is estimated from data on each household’s tax
filing status and adjusted gross income.27
Wealth- and stock-to-income ratios at any given age increase with education,
regardless of whether we look at narrow or broad measures. Average financial net worth
and stockholding among high-school dropouts are both small. Bertaut and Haliassos (1997)
found that expected utility models could account fully for the wealth-to-income ratio of this
group, but grossly overpredicted average stockholding, even for the highest risk aversion in
the grid. For the other two education categories, stockholding could be fully explained by
the expected utility model with career risk, but wealth was underpredicted.
We compare the best expected-utility calibrations in Bertaut and Haliassos (1997)
to some of the best rank-dependent utility models in our experiments and to their dual-
theory counterparts that differ only in risk aversion. Since it is important to avoid asking
“What parameters can replicate the data exactly?” (Kydland and Prescott, 1996), we
restrict ourselves to parameter grids deemed reasonable a priori (section IV) and, rather
than attempting to solve mechanically over the entire grid, we present cases suggestive of
our experience with these models.
The first panel of Table 14 shows that Q preferences, unlike EU, can account for
wealth accumulation by high school dropouts and for their limited stockholding in the first
period. However, the EU model does better in matching expected second-period ratios. For
high-school graduates, Q preferences can account for stockholding and yield higher net
worth than the EU setup. The increase in predicted net worth is most dramatic for college
graduates, but still they appear to be borrowing much less than what their career
uncertainty warrants. Q preferences also explain first-period stockholding and more of
second-period stockholding than EU. While all models tend to underpredict first-period
wealth for the two more educated classes, we have found first-period wealth to be sensitive28
to initial wealth. Our findings are consistent with inheritance being important for these two
groups, especially college graduates. Dual theory predictions are not as close to the data.
What is the size of departures from expected utility associated with these improved
predictions? In all cases, elasticity of substitution is not the inverse of risk aversion,
although it comes close for high-school graduates. Still, elasticity is positively related with
education, as a negative relationship between risk aversion and education would require
under the EU framework. In all cases, households overweight inferior outcomes, the
departure from EU being substantial for high-school dropouts but still noticeable for
college graduates. Implied rankings of education categories with respect to risk aversion
and degree of overweighting of inferior states are the same in Q and EU predictions shown.
The implication that the more educated tend to be less risk averse on average and
to overweight inferior outcomes to a lesser extent is consistent with attitudinal questions in
the SCF. The proportion of households refusing to undertake any financial risk diminishes
with education, while the proportions willing to undertake average risk for average return
and high risk for above average return increase.
17 While precise interpretation of these
responses is not always straightforward, they are at least consistent with fear of variance
(risk aversion) and of bad states (overweighting) being more prevalent among households
of lower education.
VII. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we explore the implications of non-expected utility for saving and
portfolio choice under long-run income and return uncertainty, and compare them to
expected utility and to US data on three education categories. We find that, contrary to
priors, solutions of rank-dependent utility models are not typically at kinks; neither29
kinks nor actual solutions involve zero stockholding when income risk is recognized;
and yet predictions about average wealth and risky asset holdings improve, especially
for high-school dropouts. First-order risk aversion also enhances the implied
magnitude of precautionary effects. Mere disentangling of risk aversion from elasticity
has small effects, while the Yaari certainty equivalent typically forces solutions to lie at
a “kink”, but yields wealth and portfolios farther from the data and reverses the signs
of precautionary effects.
In models with more sources of uncertainty or states, one may find more
solutions lying at a kink. However, kinks will not involve zero stockholding. Our
finding that improved predictions do not presuppose nor require solutions at kinks can
be viewed in different ways. Advocates of rank dependent utility can consider our
findings as encouraging for further experimentation. Skeptics can interpret them as
pointing out that nondifferentiability of preferences per se is not crucial to any
predictive improvements and that further experimentation with more flexible functional
forms is called for within an expected utility framework.
For all preference specifications, households in the first period of life have an
incentive to borrow in order to consume and to invest in stocks. In the second period,
they tend to save in the form of bonds and often of stocks. The findings in the
overlapping generations, expected-utility model of Constantinides, Donaldson, and
Mehra (1998) are consistent with this view. Restrictions to the ability of the young to
borrow are bound to have interesting effects. Some of those are explored in Haliassos
and Hassapis (1998), where we consider a wide range of income-related and collateral
constraints, and discuss theoretical implications for saving and portfolio behavior, as
well as complications these imply for econometric work. Generally speaking, we find
that borrowing constraints tend to reduce or eliminate precautionary wealth30
accumulation, that they can even reverse precautionary effects on stockholding, and
that they tend to bias empirical estimates of precautionary effects downwards.
Finally, the inability to account for zero stockholding even with first-order risk
aversion seems to support the view that resolution of the stockholding puzzle for
median portfolios and of the equity premium puzzle under conditions of background
income risk is not to be found solely in preferences. Instead, it is likely to require
explicit consideration of frictions such as inertia and information costs. Even so, rank-
dependent preferences may contribute to the explanation, e.g., by lowering the
information costs required to discourage stock market participation. Our notion of
conjectural equilibrium and algorithm could be used in such applications, as well as
generally in stochastic models of growth, government finance, and equity premia.31
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Table 1: Effects of Departures from Expected-Utility Maximization on Wealth and on Stock holding,





Overweighting of Inferior States
(Y and Q)
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3
Parameters:







































0 -0.11 0.19 0.45 0.00 0.00 8.22
2 -0.36 0.68 0.57 0.59 0.90 27.06 -0.26 0.73 0.85 0.72 0.41 31.93 -0.05 0.41 0.69 0.36 -32.19 11.41
3 -0.19 0.40 0.52 0.31 0.06 18.12 -0.14 0.41 0.61 0.33 -0.25 19.16 -0.00 0.23 0.52 0.19 0.71 7.12
4 -0.08 0.28 0.51 0.21 -7.74 13.62 -0.08 0.28 0.51 0.21 -7.74 13.62 0.02 0.16 0.46 0.12 0.40 5.19
5 -0.01 0.22 0.52 0.16 0.56 10.92 -0.05 0.21 0.46 0.15 0.93 10.57 0.04 0.12 0.42 0.09 0.29 4.09
6 0.03 0.18 0.52 0.13 0.33 9.12 -0.02 0.17 0.43 0.12 0.51 8.64 0.05 0.10 0.40 0.07 0.23 3.37
7 0.07 0.15 0.53 0.11 0.25 7.83 -0.00 0.14 0.42 0.10 0.37 7.31 0.05 0.08 0.39 0.06 0.19 2.86
8 0.10 0.13 0.53 0.09 0.20 6.86 0.01 0.12 0.40 0.08 0.29 6.34 0.06 0.07 0.38 0.05 0.16 2.49
9 0.12 0.11 0.53 0.08 0.17 6.11 0.02 0.11 0.39 0.07 0.24 5.60 0.07 0.06 0.37 0.04 0.14 2.20
10 0.13 0.10 0.54 0.07 0.14 5.51 0.03 0.09 0.38 0.06 0.21 5.01 0.07 0.05 0.37 0.04 0.13 1.97
HS
0 -0.09 0.15 0.44 0.00 0.00 6.37
2 -0.38 0.70 0.60 0.56 0.97 27.45 -0.26 0.91 1.02 0.76 0.34 34.14 -0.06 0.43 0.71 0.35 1.06 11.41
3 -0.21 0.42 0.55 0.29 -0.47 18.34 -0.16 0.43 0.64 0.32 12.26 19.40 -0.02 0.24 0.55 0.18 0.45 7.10
4 -0.10 0.29 0.54 0.20 0.74 13.76 -0.10 0.29 0.54 0.20 0.74 13.76 -0.00 0.17 0.48 0.12 0.30 5.16
5 -0.04 0.23 0.54 0.15 0.37 11.01 -0.07 0.22 0.49 0.14 0.44 10.65 0.01 0.13 0.44 0.09 0.22 4.06
6 0.01 0.18 0.54 0.12 0.26 9.18 -0.05 0.18 0.46 0.11 0.32 8.69 0.02 0.10 0.42 0.07 0.18 3.35
7 0.05 0.15 0.54 0.10 0.21 7.87 -0.03 0.15 0.44 0.09 0.26 7.34 0.03 0.08 0.41 0.06 0.15 2.85
8 0.07 0.13 0.54 0.09 0.17 6.89 -0.01 0.13 0.42 0.08 0.21 6.36 0.04 0.07 0.40 0.05 0.13 2.48
9 0.09 0.12 0.55 0.07 0.15 6.13 -0.00 0.11 0.41 0.07 0.18 5.61 0.04 0.06 0.39 0.04 0.12 2.19
10 0.11 0.10 0.55 0.07 0.13 5.52 0.00 0.10 0.41 0.06 0.16 5.02 0.04 0.06 0.39 0.04 0.10 1.97
CL
0 -0.39 0.18 0.31 0.00 0.00 5.78
2 -0.84 0.86 0.42 0.45 -1.20 26.82 -0.64 0.95 0.71 0.57 0.89 32.23 -0.37 0.53 0.55 0.28 -0.48 10.83
3 -0.58 0.53 0.40 0.25 0.31 18.21 -0.50 0.55 0.50 0.27 0.09 19.34 -0.32 0.30 0.41 0.15 3.15 6.79
4 -0.43 0.38 0.41 0.17 -0.23 13.74 -0.43 0.38 0.41 0.17 -0.23 13.74 -0.30 0.21 0.35 0.10 0.71 4.96
5 -0.33 0.29 0.41 0.13 1.40 11.02 -0.39 0.28 0.36 0.12 -0.89 10.64 -0.28 0.16 0.31 0.07 0.43 3.91
6 -0.27 0.24 0.42 0.10 0.44 9.20 -0.36 0.23 0.33 0.10 7.51 8.69 -0.27 0.12 0.29 0.06 0.32 3.23
7 -0.22 0.20 0.42 0.09 0.29 7.89 -0.34 0.19 0.31 0.08 0.99 7.34 -0.26 0.10 0.28 0.05 0.26 2.75
8 -0.18 0.17 0.42 0.08 0.22 6.91 -0.32 0.16 0.30 0.07 0.58 6.35 -0.25 0.09 0.27 0.04 0.22 2.40
9 -0.15 0.15 0.43 0.07 0.18 6.15 -0.30 0.14 0.29 0.06 0.42 5.60 -0.25 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.19 2.13
10 -0.13 0.13 0.43 0.06 0.16 5.76 -0.29 0.13 0.28 0.05 0.34 5.01 -0.24 0.07 0.26 0.03 0.17 1.91
Notes: LS refers to high-school dropouts; HS to high-school graduates, and CL to college graduates. W/Y and S/Y are ratios of net
financial wealth to after-tax labor income, and stock to after-tax labor income respectively. S/W is the portfolio share of risky assets.
“Exp.” denotes expectation about the second period ratio, based on information at the end of the first period. The utility gain from
stocks refers to the percentage increase in utility that households experience when they are given access to stocks as well as bonds. g
different from unity indicates overweighting of inferior states relative to an expected utility framework, since the weight attached to
the utility of the worst state is p
ã where p is its probability of occurrence; l is the weight attached to utility from bequests, g is relative
risk aversion, and r is equal to one minus the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Zero risk aversion refers to Yaari
preferences (see Section II).35
     Table 2: Effects of  Labor Income Risk on Wealth and on Stockholding under Departures from Expected Utility,





Overweighting of Inferior States
(Y and Q)
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3
Parameters:
g g=0.50, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3



















0 -0.029 0.193 0.166 0.000 0.000
2 0.110 -0.089 -0.016 0.040 1.548 0.081 -0.096 -0.007 0.045 26.344 0.121 -0.098 -0.025 0.020 -33.02
3 0.107 -0.063 -0.015 0.022 -1.610 0.095 -0.065 -0.012 0.023 -1.282 0.130 -0.070 -0.020 0.013 0.284
4 0.109 -0.051 -0.010 0.016 -8.299 0.109 -0.051 -0.010 0.016 -8.299 0.139 -0.055 -0.012 0.010 0.113
5 0.112 -0.043 -0.003 0.013 0.210 0.120 -0.042 -0.004 0.013 0.543 0.146 -0.045 -0.005 0.008 0.067
6 0.115 -0.036 0.004 0.011 0.074 0.130 -0.035 0.001 0.011 0.211 0.151 -0.038 0.002 0.007 0.047
7 0.118 -0.032 0.010 0.010 0.040 0.137 -0.030 0.006 0.009 0.121 0.155 -0.033 0.007 0.006 0.036
8 0.121 -0.028 0.015 0.009 0.026 0.143 -0.026 0.010 0.008 0.082 0.159 -0.028 0.011 0.005 0.030
9 0.123 -0.025 0.019 0.008 0.019 0.147 -0.023 0.014 0.008 0.061 0.161 -0.025 0.014 0.005 0.025
10 0.125 -0.022 0.023 0.007 0.014 0.151 -0.021 0.017 0.007 0.048 0.163 -0.023 0.017 0.004 0.022
HS
0 -0.019 0.149 0.130 0.000 0.000
2 0.074 -0.059 -0.009 0.022 2.000 0.054 -0.076 -0.001 0.026 -20.118 0.090 -0.074 -0.020 0.010 0.331
3 0.072 -0.043 -0.008 0.012 -1.612 0.064 -0.044 -0.007 0.013 11.425 0.097 -0.054 -0.014 0.006 0.067
4 0.074 -0.035 -0.005 0.009 0.254 0.074 -0.035 -0.005 0.009 0.254 0.103 -0.044 -0.008 0.005 0.033
5 0.077 -0.030 -0.001 0.007 0.057 0.083 -0.030 -0.001 0.007 0.094 0.109 -0.037 -0.002 0.004 0.021
6 0.080 -0.027 0.004 0.006 0.026 0.091 -0.026 0.003 0.006 0.052 0.113 -0.032 0.003 0.004 0.016
7 0.083 -0.024 0.007 0.005 0.015 0.097 -0.023 0.007 0.005 0.034 0.117 -0.028 0.007 0.004 0.012
8 0.086 -0.021 0.011 0.005 0.010 0.103 -0.020 0.010 0.005 0.024 0.120 -0.024 0.011 0.003 0.010
9 0.088 -0.019 0.014 0.005 0.008 0.107 -0.018 0.013 0.004 0.019 0.122 -0.022 0.014 0.003 0.008
10 0.090 -0.017 0.017 0.004 0.006 0.111 -0.016 0.016 0.004 0.015 0.124 -0.020 0.016 0.003 0.007
CL
0 -0.024 0.182 0.110 0.000 0.000
2 0.081 -0.062 -0.021 0.012 -1.042 0.056 -0.066 -0.017 0.013 2.148 0.102 -0.083 -0.031 0.004 -1.790
3 0.077 -0.046 -0.019 0.007 3.004 0.067 -0.047 -0.018 0.007 -2.728 0.110 -0.062 -0.025 0.003 2.602
4 0.079 -0.038 -0.016 0.005 -1.106 0.079 -0.038 -0.016 0.005 -1.106 0.118 -0.051 -0.019 0.003 0.352
5 0.083 -0.034 -0.012 0.004 0.959 0.091 -0.033 -0.012 0.004 -1.427 0.125 -0.043 -0.014 0.003 0.165
6 0.087 -0.030 -0.009 0.004 0.139 0.100 -0.029 -0.009 0.004 7.112 0.130 -0.038 -0.009 0.002 0.103
7 0.090 -0.027 -0.006 0.003 0.059 0.109 -0.026 -0.005 0.003 0.672 0.135 -0.033 -0.005 0.002 0.074
8 0.094 -0.024 -0.003 0.003 0.034 0.115 -0.023 -0.002 0.003 0.310 0.139 -0.030 -0.002 0.002 0.058
9 0.097 -0.022 0.000 0.003 0.023 0.121 -0.021 0.001 0.003 0.190 0.142 -0.027 0.001 0.002 0.047
10 0.099 -0.020 0.002 0.003 0.017 0.126 -0.019 0.003 0.003 0.133 0.145 -0.024 0.003 0.002 0.040
Notes: See Table 1.36
Table 3: Effects of  Labor Income Risk on Wealth and on Stockholding under
Extreme Overweighting of Inferior States
(Households with Less than High School Education)
Parameters:
ã=0.15, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3




0 0.117 0.193 0.239 0.000 0.000
2 0.157 0.016 0.068 0.010 0.026
3 0.162 0.001 0.046 0.005 0.015
4 0.166 -0.003 0.039 0.004 0.012
5 0.168 -0.004 0.037 0.003 0.009
6 0.170 -0.004 0.037 0.002 0.008
7 0.171 -0.004 0.037 0.002 0.007
8 0.172 -0.004 0.037 0.002 0.006
9 0.173 -0.004 0.037 0.002 0.005
10 0.174 -0.003 0.037 0.001 0.005
Notes: See Table 1. g different from unity indicates overweighting of inferior states
relative to an expected utility framework, since the weight attached to the utility of the
worst state is p
ã where p is its probability of occurrence.37
     Table 4: Effects of Departures from Expected-Utility Maximization on Wealth and on Stock holding,






Overweighting of Inferior States
(Y and Q)
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3
Parameters:
g g=0.50, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3


































0 -0.11 0.21 0.47 0.00 0.00 9.11
2 -0.34 0.66 0.57 0.60 0.80 26.86 -0.24 0.71 0.85 0.73 0.42 31.69 -0.03 0.40 0.69 0.37 -2.13 11.41
3 -0.17 0.39 0.52 0.32 0.10 18.02 -0.12 0.41 0.62 0.34 -0.12 19.31 0.01 0.22 0.52 0.19 0.89 7.14
4 -0.06 0.27 0.51 0.21 -1.25 13.56 -0.06 0.27 0.51 0.21 -1.25 13.56 0.04 0.18 0.49 0.13 0.46 5.09
5 0.01 0.21 0.52 0.16 0.67 10.89 -0.03 0.21 0.46 0.15 1.61 10.54 0.06 0.14 0.45 0.10 0.32 3.92
6 0.05 0.17 0.52 0.13 0.36 9.10 0.00 0.16 0.43 0.12 0.64 8.62 0.07 0.11 0.42 0.08 0.24 3.19
7 0.09 0.14 0.53 0.11 0.26 7.82 0.02 0.14 0.42 0.10 0.43 7.30 0.08 0.09 0.41 0.06 0.20 2.69
8 0.11 0.12 0.53 0.09 0.21 6.86 0.03 0.12 0.40 0.08 0.33 6.33 0.08 0.08 0.39 0.05 0.17 2.33
9 0.14 0.11 0.54 0.08 0.17 6.11 0.04 0.10 0.39 0.07 0.27 5.59 0.09 0.07 0.39 0.05 0.15 2.06
10 0.15 0.10 0.54 0.07 0.15 5.51 0.05 0.09 0.39 0.06 0.23 5.01 0.09 0.06 0.38 0.04 0.13 1.84
HS
0 -0.09 0.16 0.45 0.00 0.00 7.04
2 -0.37 0.69 0.60 0.56 0.84 27.31 -0.26 0.74 0.86 0.69 0.26 32.25 -0.05 0.42 0.71 0.35 1.19 11.41
3 -0.20 0.41 0.55 0.30 -0.30 18.26 -0.15 0.42 0.64 0.32 -4.55 19.31 -0.01 0.24 0.55 0.18 0.47 7.11
4 -0.09 0.29 0.54 0.20 0.83 13.71 -0.09 0.29 0.54 0.20 0.83 13.71 0.01* 0.19* 0.51* 0.12* 0.30* 5.21*
5 -0.02 0.22 0.54 0.15 0.39 10.97 -0.06 0.22 0.49 0.14 0.47 10.62 0.03 0.14 0.47 0.09 0.23 4.00
6 0.02 0.18 0.54 0.12 0.27 9.15 -0.03 0.17 0.46 0.11 0.33 8.67 0.04 0.11 0.44 0.07 0.18 3.24
7 0.06 0.15 0.54 0.10 0.21 7.85 -0.01 0.14 0.44 0.09 0.26 7.33 0.04 0.10 0.43 0.06 0.15 2.72
8 0.09 0.13 0.55 0.09 0.17 6.88 -0.00 0.12 0.43 0.08 0.22 6.35 0.05 0.08 0.42 0.05 0.13 2.35
9 0.11 0.11 0.55 0.08 0.15 6.12 0.01 0.11 0.42 0.07 0.19 5.60 0.05 0.07 0.41 0.04 0.12 2.07
10 0.12 0.10 0.55 0.07 0.13 5.51 0.02 0.10 0.41 0.06 0.17 5.01 0.06 0.06 0.40 0.04 0.10 1.85
CL
0 -0.39 0.20 0.32 0.00 0.00 6.32
2 -0.82 0.85 0.42 0.46 -1.91 26.71 -0.62 0.94 0.70 0.57 0.80 32.10 -0.36 0.52 0.55 0.28 -0.30 10.84
3 -0.56 0.52 0.40 0.25 0.30 18.15 -0.48 0.54 0.49 0.27 0.12 19.27 -0.31 0.30 0.40 0.15 -6.41 6.80
4 -0.41 0.37 0.40 0.17 -0.13 13.70 -0.41 0.37 0.40 0.17 -0.13 13.88 -0.28 0.20 0.34 0.10 1.00 4.97
5 -0.32 0.28 0.41 0.13 3.74 10.99 -0.37 0.28 0.36 0.13 -0.46 10.62 -0.26 0.18 0.33 0.08 0.55 3.85
6 -0.25 0.23 0.41 0.11 0.50 9.18 -0.34 0.22 0.33 0.10 -1.66 8.67 -0.25 0.14 0.31 0.06 0.38 3.12
7 -0.20 0.19 0.42 0.09 0.31 7.88 -0.32 0.19 0.31 0.08 2.58 7.33 -0.24 0.12 0.30 0.05 0.29 2.62
8 -0.17 0.17 0.42 0.08 0.24 6.90 -0.30 0.16 0.30 0.07 0.86 6.35 -0.23 0.10 0.29 0.04 0.24 2.26
9 -0.14 0.15 0.43 0.07 0.19 6.14 -0.29 0.14 0.29 0.06 0.55 5.60 -0.23 0.09 0.28 0.04 0.21 1.99
10 -0.11 0.13 0.43 0.06 0.16 5.56 -0.27 0.12 0.28 0.05 0.41 5.01 -0.22 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.18 1.78
Notes: See Table 1. An asterisk * means that the solution is at a point where the utility function is not differentiable (See Section II).38
     Table 5: Effects of Departures from Expected-Utility Maximization on Wealth and on Stock holding,






Overweighting of Inferior States
(Y and Q)
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3
Parameters:
g g=0.50, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3


































0 -0.10 0.17 0.43 0.00 0.00 7.21
2 -0.38 0.69 0.58 0.58 1.12 27.28 -0.27 0.75 0.85 0.71 0.42 32.20 -0.06 0.43 0.70 0.36 3.37 11.41
3 -0.21 0.41 0.53 0.31 0.01 18.24 -0.16 0.43 0.62 0.33 -0.48 19.29 -0.02 0.24 0.52 0.18 0.61 7.11
4 -0.10 0.29 0.52 0.21 2.72 13.70 -0.10 0.29 0.52 0.21 2.72 13.70 0.00* 0.19* 0.49* 0.12* 0.37* 5.20*
5 -0.03 0.22 0.52 0.15 0.49 10.97 -0.06 0.22 0.46 0.15 0.70 10.61 0.02 0.14 0.45 0.09 0.27 3.99
6 0.02 0.18 0.52 0.12 0.31 9.15 -0.04 0.17 0.43 0.11 0.44 8.67 0.03 0.12 0.42 0.07 0.21 3.23
7 0.05 0.15 0.52 0.10 0.24 7.85 -0.02 0.14 0.41 0.09 0.33 7.33 0.04 0.10 0.40 0.06 0.18 2.72
8 0.08 0.13 0.53 0.09 0.19 6.88 -0.01 0.12 0.40 0.08 0.27 6.35 0.04 0.08 0.39 0.05 0.15 2.35
9 0.10 0.11 0.53 0.08 0.16 6.12 0.00 0.11 0.39 0.07 0.23 5.60 0.05 0.07 0.38 0.04 0.13 2.07
10 0.12 0.10 0.53 0.07 0.14 5.51 0.01 0.10 0.38 0.06 0.20 5.01 0.05 0.06 0.38 0.04 0.12 1.85
HS
0 -0.08 0.15 0.44 0.00 0.00 6.34
2 -0.40 0.71 0.60 0.55 1.14 27.59 -0.28 0.77 0.86 0.68 0.18 32.58 -0.06 0.43 0.72 0.35 1.12 11.41
3 -0.22 0.42 0.55 0.29 -0.87 18.43 -0.17 0.44 0.64 0.31 2.67 19.49 -0.02 0.24 0.55 0.18 0.46 7.10
4 -0.12 0.30 0.54 0.19 0.65 13.82 -0.12 0.30 0.54 0.19 0.65 13.82 0.01 0.17 0.48 0.12 0.30 5.16
5 -0.05 0.23 0.54 0.15 0.36 11.05 -0.09 0.22 0.49 0.14 0.41 10.78 0.02 0.15 0.47 0.09 0.23 4.03
6 -0.00 0.19 0.54 0.12 0.26 9.20 -0.06 0.18 0.46 0.11 0.31 8.72 0.03 0.12 0.44 0.07 0.18 3.26
7 0.03 0.16 0.54 0.10 0.20 7.89 -0.05 0.15 0.43 0.09 0.25 7.41 0.04 0.10 0.43 0.06 0.15 2.74
8 0.06 0.14 0.54 0.08 0.17 6.90 -0.03 0.13 0.42 0.07 0.21 6.37 0.04 0.08 0.41 0.05 0.13 2.36
9 0.08 0.12 0.54 0.07 0.14 6.14 -0.02 0.11 0.41 0.06 0.18 5.62 0.05 0.07 0.41 0.04 0.12 2.08
10 0.10 0.11 0.55 0.07 0.13 5.53 -0.01 0.10 0.40 0.06 0.16 5.02 0.05 0.06 0.40 0.04 0.10 1.85
CL
0 -0.39 0.16 0.30 0.00 0.00 5.07
2 -0.86 0.87 0.42 0.45 -0.73 26.95 -0.65 0.96 0.71 0.57 1.11 32.38 -0.39 0.54 0.56 0.28 -0.86 10.82
3 -0.60 0.54 0.41 0.25 0.33 18.29 -0.51 0.56 0.50 0.27 0.06 19.43 -0.34 0.31 0.41 0.15 1.38 6.77
4 -0.45 0.38 0.41 0.17 -0.42 13.80 -0.45 0.38 0.41 0.17 -0.42 13.80 -0.31 0.21 0.35 0.10 0.57 4.94
5 -0.35 0.30 0.41 0.13 0.90 11.06 -0.40 0.29 0.36 0.12 -3.41 10.68 -0.30 0.16 0.32 0.07 0.38 3.90
6 -0.28 0.24 0.42 0.10 0.40 9.23 -0.38 0.23 0.33 0.10 1.34 8.71 -0.29 0.15 0.31 0.06 0.29 3.18
7 -0.24 0.20 0.42 0.09 0.28 7.91 -0.35 0.19 0.31 0.08 0.65 7.36 -0.28 0.13 0.30 0.05 0.23 2.66
8 -0.20 0.17 0.42 0.07 0.22 6.93 -0.34 0.17 0.30 0.07 0.45 6.37 -0.27 0.11 0.29 0.04 0.20 2.29
9 -0.17 0.15 0.43 0.07 0.18 6.16 -0.32 0.14 0.29 0.06 0.35 5.65 -0.26 0.09 0.28 0.04 0.17 2.01
10 -0.15 0.14 0.43 0.06 0.15 6.34 -0.31 0.13 0.28 0.05 0.29 5.04 -0.26 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.15 1.79
Notes: See Table 1. An asterisk * means that the solution is at a point where the utility function is not differentiable (See Section II).39
     Table 6: Effects of Departures from Expected-Utility Maximization on Wealth and on Stock holding,






Overweighting of Inferior States
(Y and Q)
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3
Parameters:
g g=0.50, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3


































0 -0.12 0.28 0.54 0.00 0.00 12.08
2 -0.27 0.61 0.57 0.66 0.65 26.22 -0.18 0.65 0.86 0.80 0.43 30.86 0.02 0.36 0.70 0.41 -0.25 11.42
3 -0.10 0.36 0.52 0.35 0.17 17.71 -0.06 0.37 0.62 0.37 0.07 18.70 0.08 0.24 0.57 0.22 -1.58 7.03
4 0.00 0.25 0.51 0.24 -0.15 13.41 0.00 0.25 0.51 0.24 -0.15 13.41 0.10 0.16 0.49 0.14 1.40 4.98
5 0.07 0.19 0.52 0.18 -20.3 10.80 0.04 0.19 0.46 0.17 -0.47 10.46 0.12 0.12 0.45 0.11 0.59 3.86
6 0.11 0.16 0.53 0.14 0.58 9.05 0.07 0.15 0.43 0.13 -1.69 8.59 0.13 0.10 0.42 0.08 0.40 3.16
7 0.15 0.13 0.54 0.12 0.34 7.80 0.08 0.13 0.41 0.11 2.59 7.28 0.14 0.08 0.41 0.07 0.30 2.68
8 0.17 0.12 0.55 0.10 0.25 6.84 0.10 0.11 0.40 0.09 0.87 6.32 0.14 0.07 0.39 0.06 0.25 2.32
9 0.19 0.10 0.55 0.09 0.20 6.10 0.11 0.10 0.39 0.08 0.55 5.59 0.15 0.06 0.38 0.05 0.21 2.05
10 0.21 0.09 0.56 0.08 0.17 5.50 0.12 0.09 0.38 0.07 0.42 5.01 0.15 0.06 0.38 0.05 0.18 1.84
HS
0 -0.09 0.21 0.50 0.00 0.00 9.29
2 -0.32 0.65 0.59 0.59 0.66 26.82 -0.22 0.70 0.87 0.72 0.32 31.64 -0.01 0.39 0.71 0.36 3.77 11.41
3 -0.15 0.38 0.54 0.31 -0.02 18.00 -0.10 0.40 0.64 0.33 -0.45 19.02 0.03 0.22 0.55 0.19 0.60 7.14
4 -0.04 0.27 0.54 0.21 2.77 13.55 -0.04 0.27 0.54 0.21 2.77 13.55 0.06 0.18 0.51 0.13 0.36 5.08
5 0.02 0.21 0.54 0.16 0.48 10.88 -0.01 0.20 0.49 0.15 0.67 10.53 0.08 0.13 0.47 0.09 0.26 3.92
6 0.07 0.17 0.55 0.13 0.30 9.09 0.02 0.16 0.46 0.12 0.42 8.62 0.09 0.11 0.45 0.07 0.20 3.19
7 0.11 0.14 0.55 0.11 0.23 7.82 0.04 0.13 0.44 0.10 0.32 7.30 0.09 0.09 0.43 0.06 0.17 2.69
8 0.13 0.12 0.56 0.09 0.19 6.86 0.05 0.12 0.43 0.08 0.26 6.33 0.10 0.08 0.42 0.05 0.15 2.33
9 0.15 0.11 0.56 0.08 0.16 6.11 0.06 0.10 0.42 0.07 0.22 5.59 0.10 0.07 0.41 0.05 0.13 2.06
10 0.17 0.10 0.57 0.07 0.14 5.51 0.07 0.09 0.41 0.06 0.19 5.01 0.11 0.06 0.41 0.04 0.11 1.84
CL
0 -0.40 0.25 0.35 0.00 0.00 8.11
2 -0.77 0.81 0.40 0.47 3.24 26.34 -0.59 0.90 0.69 0.59 0.62 31.66 -0.32 0.49 0.54 0.29 -0.05 10.86
3 -0.52 0.49 0.39 0.26 0.28 17.94 -0.44 0.51 0.48 0.28 0.16 19.05 -0.26 0.28 0.39 0.15 -0.41 6.84
4 -0.37 0.35 0.39 0.18 0.00 13.57 -0.37 0.35 0.39 0.18 0.00 13.57 -0.23 0.22 0.36 0.10 -0.95 4.91
5 -0.27 0.27 0.40 0.14 -0.57 10.91 -0.32 0.26 0.35 0.13 -0.11 10.54 -0.21 0.17 0.33 0.08 16.12 3.78
6 -0.21 0.22 0.41 0.11 1.04 9.13 -0.29 0.21 0.32 0.10 -0.23 8.62 -0.20 0.14 0.31 0.06 1.09 3.07
7 -0.16 0.18 0.41 0.09 0.41 7.85 -0.26 0.18 0.30 0.08 -0.39 7.30 -0.19 0.11 0.29 0.05 0.61 2.59
8 -0.12 0.16 0.42 0.08 0.28 6.88 -0.25 0.15 0.29 0.07 -0.72 6.33 -0.18 0.10 0.28 0.04 0.43 2.24
9 -0.09 0.14 0.43 0.07 0.22 6.13 -0.23 0.13 0.28 0.06 -1.80 5.59 -0.18 0.09 0.27 0.04 0.34 1.98
10 -0.07 0.13 0.43 0.06 0.18 6.94 -0.22 0.12 0.27 0.05 7.84 5.00 -0.17 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.29 1.77
Notes: See Table 1. An asterisk * means that the solution is at a point where the utility function is not differentiable (See Section II).
Persistence refers to parameter ñY in the stochastic process followed by the logarithm of  one type of shocks to annual labor incomes:
ut=ñYut-1+åt. See Section III.40
     Table 7: Effects of Departures from Expected-Utility Maximization on Wealth and on Stock holding,






Overweighting of Inferior States
(Y and Q)
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3
Parameters:
g g=0.50, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3


































0 -0.09 0.04 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.84
2 -0.47 0.76 0.59 0.55 -0.90 28.16 -0.33 0.82 0.85 0.67 0.69 33.23 -0.15 0.49 0.71 0.34 0.86 11.36
3 -0.29 0.46 0.54 0.29 3.65 18.80 -0.23 0.48 0.63 0.31 1.18 19.87 -0.11 0.29 0.54 0.17 0.43 7.00
4 -0.18 0.33 0.52 0.19 0.58 14.09 -0.18 0.33 0.52 0.19 0.58 14.09 -0.10 0.20 0.46 0.11 0.29 5.06
5 -0.12 0.26 0.52 0.14 0.36 11.26 -0.16 0.25 0.47 0.14 0.40 10.90 -0.09 0.15 0.42 0.08 0.22 3.97
6 -0.07 0.21 0.52 0.12 0.26 9.37 -0.14 0.20 0.43 0.11 0.31 8.88 -0.08 0.12 0.40 0.07 0.18 3.26
7 -0.04 0.18 0.52 0.10 0.21 8.02 -0.13 0.17 0.41 0.09 0.25 7.49 -0.08 0.10 0.38 0.05 0.15 2.77
8 -0.02 0.15 0.52 0.08 0.17 7.01 -0.12 0.14 0.39 0.07 0.21 6.47 -0.07 0.09 0.37 0.05 0.13 2.41
9 0.00 0.13 0.52 0.07 0.15 6.23 -0.11 0.13 0.38 0.06 0.19 5.70 -0.07 0.08 0.36 0.04 0.12 2.14
10 0.02 0.12 0.52 0.06 0.13 5.60 -0.10 0.11 0.37 0.06 0.16 5.09 -0.07 0.07 0.35 0.04 0.11 1.92
HS
0 -0.07 0.04 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.56
2 -0.45 0.75 0.61 0.54 -1.48 28.18 -0.32 0.81 0.87 0.66 -3.66 33.26 -0.14 0.49 0.73 0.34 0.73 11.35
3 -0.27 0.46 0.56 0.28 1.33 18.81 -0.22 0.47 0.64 0.30 0.88 19.89 -0.10 0.29 0.56 0.17 0.38 6.99
4 -0.17 0.33 0.54 0.19 0.49 14.10 -0.17 0.33 0.54 0.19 0.49 14.10 -0.09 0.20 0.48 0.11 0.26 5.05
5 -0.11 0.25 0.54 0.14 0.32 11.27 -0.15 0.25 0.49 0.14 0.35 10.91 -0.08 0.15 0.44 0.08 0.20 3.96
6 -0.06 0.21 0.54 0.11 0.24 9.38 -0.13 0.20 0.45 0.10 0.27 8.89 -0.07 0.12 0.42 0.06 0.16 3.26
7 -0.03 0.17 0.53 0.09 0.19 8.03 -0.12 0.17 0.43 0.09 0.22 7.49 -0.07 0.10 0.40 0.05 0.14 2.77
8 -0.01 0.15 0.53 0.08 0.16 7.02 -0.11 0.14 0.41 0.07 0.19 6.48 -0.06 0.09 0.39 0.05 0.12 2.41
9 0.01 0.13 0.53 0.07 0.14 6.24 -0.10 0.13 0.40 0.06 0.17 5.70 -0.06 0.08 0.38 0.04 0.11 2.13
10 0.03 0.12 0.53 0.06 0.12 5.61 -0.09 0.11 0.39 0.05 0.15 5.09 -0.06 0.07 0.37 0.03 0.10 1.91
CL
0 -0.37 0.04 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.28
2 -0.91 0.92 0.44 0.44 -0.17 27.44 -0.69 1.01 0.72 0.56 -1.70 32.92 -0.46 0.60 0.58 0.28 1.45 10.72
3 -0.65 0.57 0.42 0.24 3.68 18.61 -0.56 0.59 0.51 0.26 -9.84 19.75 -0.42 0.35 0.43 0.14 0.56 6.65
4 -0.50 0.41 0.42 0.17 1.01 14.03 -0.50 0.41 0.42 0.17 1.01 14.03 -0.40 0.25 0.36 0.09 0.36 4.82
5 -0.41 0.32 0.42 0.13 0.45 11.25 -0.47 0.31 0.37 0.12 0.58 10.86 -0.39 0.19 0.32 0.07 0.27 3.78
6 -0.35 0.26 0.42 0.10 0.31 9.38 -0.45 0.25 0.34 0.09 0.42 8.86 -0.38 0.15 0.30 0.06 0.22 3.11
7 -0.30 0.22 0.42 0.08 0.24 8.04 -0.44 0.21 0.32 0.08 0.33 7.47 -0.37 0.13 0.29 0.05 0.18 2.65
8 -0.27 0.19 0.43 0.07 0.19 7.03 -0.42 0.18 0.30 0.06 0.28 6.46 -0.37 0.11 0.27 0.04 0.16 2.30
9 -0.24 0.17 0.43 0.06 0.16 6.25 -0.42 0.16 0.29 0.06 0.24 5.69 -0.37 0.10 0.27 0.03 0.14 2.04
10 -0.22 0.15 0.43 0.06 0.14 5.62 -0.41 0.14 0.28 0.05 0.21 5.09 -0.36 0.09 0.26 0.03 0.13 1.83
Notes: See Table 1. Persistence refers to parameter ñY in the stochastic process followed by the logarithm of  one type of shocks to
annual labor incomes: ut=ñYut-1+åt. See Section IV.41
     Table 8: Effects of Departures from Expected-Utility Maximization on Wealth and on Stock holding,






Overweighting of Inferior States
(Y and Q)
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3
Parameters:
g g=0.50, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3


































0 -0.08 0.19 0.46 0.00 0.00 7.09
2 -0.35 0.65 0.56 0.58 0.86 25.49 -0.24 0.71 0.83 0.71 0.38 30.27 -0.04 0.40 0.68 0.36 10.33 10.56
3 -0.18 0.38 0.51 0.31 0.03 16.76 -0.13 0.40 0.60 0.33 -0.36 17.77 0.00 0.22 0.51 0.18 0.68 6.42
4 -0.07 0.27 0.50 0.21 8.79 12.43 -0.07 0.27 0.50 0.21 8.79 12.43 0.03 0.17 0.47 0.12 0.40 4.53
5 -0.01 0.20 0.50 0.16 0.53 9.87 -0.04 0.20 0.45 0.15 0.82 9.54 0.04 0.13 0.43 0.09 0.29 3.45
6 0.04 0.16 0.51 0.13 0.33 8.19 -0.01 0.16 0.42 0.12 0.49 7.74 0.05 0.10 0.41 0.07 0.23 2.79
7 0.08 0.14 0.52 0.10 0.24 7.00 0.00 0.13 0.41 0.10 0.36 6.51 0.06 0.09 0.40 0.06 0.19 2.34
8 0.10 0.12 0.52 0.09 0.20 6.12 0.02 0.11 0.39 0.08 0.29 5.63 0.06 0.07 0.39 0.05 0.16 2.02
9 0.12 0.10 0.53 0.08 0.17 5.44 0.03 0.10 0.39 0.07 0.24 4.96 0.07 0.06 0.38 0.05 0.14 1.78
10 0.14 0.09 0.53 0.07 0.14 4.90 0.03 0.09 0.38 0.06 0.21 4.44 0.07 0.06 0.37 0.04 0.13 1.59
HS
0 -0.07 0.15 0.45 0.00 0.00 5.47
2 -0.37 0.68 0.59 0.55 0.91 26.15 -0.26 0.73 0.85 0.68 0.18 31.04 -0.06 0.42 0.70 0.34 1.01 10.70
3 -0.20 0.40 0.54 0.29 -0.64 17.19 -0.15 0.41 0.62 0.31 4.20 18.23 -0.02 0.23 0.54 0.17 0.44 6.49
4 -0.09 0.28 0.53 0.20 0.70 12.73 -0.09 0.28 0.53 0.20 0.70 12.73 0.00 0.16 0.47 0.11 0.29 4.64
5 -0.03 0.21 0.53 0.15 0.37 10.07 -0.06 0.21 0.48 0.14 0.43 9.73 0.02 0.13 0.46 0.09 0.22 3.55
6 0.02 0.17 0.53 0.12 0.26 8.33 -0.04 0.17 0.45 0.11 0.32 7.86 0.03 0.11 0.43 0.07 0.18 2.85
7 0.05 0.14 0.53 0.10 0.21 7.10 -0.02 0.14 0.43 0.09 0.25 6.60 0.03 0.09 0.42 0.06 0.15 2.38
8 0.08 0.12 0.54 0.08 0.17 6.19 -0.01 0.12 0.42 0.08 0.21 5.68 0.04 0.08 0.41 0.05 0.13 2.05
9 0.10 0.11 0.54 0.07 0.15 5.48 0.00 0.10 0.41 0.07 0.18 5.00 0.04 0.07 0.40 0.04 0.11 1.80
10 0.12 0.10 0.54 0.07 0.13 4.93 0.01 0.09 0.40 0.06 0.16 4.46 0.05 0.06 0.39 0.04 0.10 1.60
CL
0 -0.37 0.18 0.32 0.00 0.00 4.93
2 -0.82 0.84 0.41 0.45 -1.43 25.61 -0.62 0.92 0.69 0.56 0.83 30.94 -0.37 0.51 0.54 0.28 -0.58 10.17
3 -0.57 0.51 0.39 0.25 0.29 17.12 -0.49 0.53 0.49 0.27 0.06 18.23 -0.32 0.29 0.40 0.15 2.24 6.22
4 -0.42 0.36 0.40 0.17 -0.31 12.75 -0.42 0.36 0.40 0.17 -0.31 12.75 -0.29 0.20 0.34 0.10 0.66 4.45
5 -0.32 0.27 0.40 0.13 1.13 10.12 -0.38 0.27 0.35 0.12 -1.32 9.75 -0.27 0.17 0.33 0.07 0.43 3.42
6 -0.26 0.22 0.41 0.10 0.42 8.37 -0.35 0.21 0.32 0.10 2.65 7.88 -0.26 0.13 0.30 0.06 0.32 2.75
7 -0.21 0.19 0.41 0.09 0.29 7.14 -0.33 0.18 0.30 0.08 0.84 6.61 -0.25 0.11 0.29 0.05 0.25 2.29
8 -0.17 0.16 0.42 0.07 0.22 6.22 -0.31 0.15 0.29 0.07 0.53 5.69 -0.25 0.10 0.28 0.04 0.21 1.96
9 -0.15 0.14 0.42 0.07 0.18 5.51 -0.30 0.13 0.28 0.06 0.40 5.00 -0.24 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.18 1.72
10 -0.12 0.12 0.42 0.06 0.16 5.17 -0.29 0.12 0.27 0.05 0.33 4.46 -0.24 0.07 0.27 0.03 0.16 1.53
Notes: See Table 1.42
     Table 9: Effects of Departures from Expected-Utility Maximization on Wealth and on Stock holding,






Overweighting of Inferior States
(Y and Q)
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3
Parameters:
g g=0.50, l l=0.25, r r=-3 3


































0 -0.11 0.19 0.45 0.00 0.00 8.57
2 -0.37 0.68 0.58 0.59 0.91 27.55 -0.26 0.74 0.85 0.72 0.42 32.45 -0.05 0.42 0.70 0.36 -13.50 11.68
3 -0.19 0.41 0.53 0.31 0.07 18.55 -0.15 0.42 0.62 0.33 -0.23 19.59 -0.01 0.24 0.53 0.19 0.72 7.35
4 -0.09 0.29 0.52 0.21 -4.69 14.00 -0.09 0.29 0.52 0.21 -4.69 14.00 0.02 0.19 0.49 0.13 0.41 5.33
5 -0.02 0.22 0.52 0.16 0.57 11.26 -0.05 0.22 0.47 0.15 0.98 10.90 0.04 0.14 0.45 0.09 0.29 4.11
6 0.03 0.18 0.52 0.13 0.33 9.42 -0.02 0.17 0.44 0.12 0.52 8.93 0.05 0.12 0.42 0.07 0.23 3.35
7 0.07 0.15 0.53 0.11 0.25 8.10 -0.00 0.14 0.42 0.10 0.37 7.57 0.06 0.10 0.41 0.06 0.19 2.82
8 0.09 0.13 0.53 0.09 0.20 7.10 0.01 0.12 0.40 0.08 0.29 6.57 0.06 0.08 0.40 0.05 0.16 2.44
9 0.12 0.11 0.54 0.08 0.17 6.33 0.02 0.11 0.39 0.07 0.25 5.80 0.07 0.07 0.39 0.05 0.14 2.15
10 0.13 0.10 0.54 0.07 0.14 5.71 0.03 0.10 0.39 0.06 0.21 5.19 0.07 0.06 0.38 0.04 0.12 1.93
HS
0 -0.09 0.15 0.44 0.00 0.00 6.64
2 -0.39 0.70 0.60 0.56 0.99 27.86 -0.27 0.76 0.87 0.68 0.25 32.84 -0.07 0.44 0.72 0.35 1.07 11.63
3 -0.21 0.42 0.55 0.29 -0.42 18.70 -0.16 0.44 0.64 0.32 35.97 19.77 -0.03 0.25 0.55 0.18 0.45 7.29
4 -0.11 0.30 0.54 0.20 0.75 14.09 -0.11 0.30 0.54 0.20 0.75 14.09 -0.00 0.17 0.48 0.12 0.30 5.33
5 -0.04 0.23 0.54 0.15 0.38 11.31 -0.07 0.22 0.49 0.14 0.44 10.95 0.01* 0.15* 0.47* 0.09* 0.22* 4.18*
6 0.01 0.19 0.54 0.12 0.26 9.45 -0.05 0.18 0.46 0.11 0.32 8.96 0.02 0.12 0.45 0.07 0.18 3.39
7 0.04 0.16 0.54 0.10 0.21 8.12 -0.03 0.15 0.44 0.09 0.26 7.58 0.03 0.10 0.43 0.06 0.15 2.85
8 0.07 0.14 0.55 0.09 0.17 7.11 -0.02 0.13 0.43 0.08 0.21 6.57 0.04 0.09 0.42 0.05 0.13 2.46
9 0.09 0.12 0.55 0.07 0.15 6.33 -0.01 0.11 0.42 0.07 0.18 5.80 0.04 0.08 0.41 0.04 0.11 2.17
10 0.11 0.11 0.55 0.07 0.13 5.71 0.00 0.10 0.41 0.06 0.16 5.20 0.04 0.07 0.40 0.04 0.10 1.94
CL
0 -0.40 0.18 0.31 0.00 0.00 6.04
2 -0.84 0.87 0.42 0.46 -1.14 27.20 -0.64 0.96 0.71 0.57 0.91 6.57 -0.38 0.53 0.56 0.28 -0.45 11.04
3 -0.58 0.53 0.41 0.25 0.31 18.55 -0.50 0.55 0.50 0.27 0.10 12.40 -0.33 0.31 0.41 0.15 3.63 6.97
4 -0.43 0.38 0.41 0.17 -0.21 14.05 -0.43 0.38 0.41 0.17 -0.21 15.36 -0.30 0.21 0.35 0.10 0.73 5.12
5 -0.34 0.30 0.41 0.13 1.51 11.31 -0.39 0.29 0.36 0.12 -0.79 17.44 -0.28* 0.19* 0.34* 0.07* 0.45* 4.04*
6 -0.27 0.24 0.42 0.10 0.45 9.46 -0.36 0.23 0.33 0.10 19.61 19.06 -0.27 0.15 0.32 0.06 0.33 3.27
7 -0.22 0.20 0.42 0.09 0.29 8.14 -0.34 0.19 0.31 0.08 1.06 20.40 -0.26 0.13 0.30 0.05 0.26 2.75
8 -0.18 0.17 0.43 0.08 0.23 7.14 -0.32 0.17 0.30 0.07 0.60 21.53 -0.25 0.11 0.29 0.04 0.22 2.37
9 -0.15 0.15 0.43 0.07 0.19 6.36 -0.31 0.14 0.29 0.06 0.43 22.47 -0.24 0.10 0.28 0.04 0.19 2.09
10 -0.13 0.14 0.43 0.06 0.16 5.95 -0.30 0.13 0.28 0.05 0.34 23.28 -0.24 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.16 1.86
Notes: See Table 1. An asterisk * means that the solution is at a point where the utility function is not differentiable (See Section II).43
     Table 10: Effects of Departures from Expected-Utility Maximization
on Wealth and on Stock holding,




Overweighting of Inferior States
(Y and Q)
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25, r r=1-
1/0.95
Parameters:
g g=0.50, l l=0.25, r r=1-
1/0.95























0 -0.71 0.19 -0.15 0.00 0.00 8.22
2 -0.51 0.60 0.21 0.42 -0.61 20.52 -0.45 0.30 0.01 0.18 -1.66 7.26
3 -0.46 0.32 0.02 0.18 -1.09 12.22 -0.42* 0.20* -0.06* 0.10* 24.3* 4.53*
4 -0.44 0.21 -0.05 0.11 -2.94 8.69 -0.41 0.13 -0.10 0.06 1.41 3.18
5 -0.42 0.16 -0.09 0.08 4.25 6.74 -0.40 0.10 -0.13 0.05 0.78 2.45
6 -0.41 0.13 -0.11 0.06 1.41 5.50 -0.39 0.08 -0.14 0.04 0.55 2.00
7 -0.40 0.10 -0.12 0.05 0.89 4.65 -0.39 0.07 -0.15 0.03 0.44 1.69
8 -0.40 0.09 -0.13 0.04 0.67 4.02 -0.39 0.06 -0.16 0.03 0.37 1.46
9 -0.39 0.08 -0.14 0.04 0.54 3.54 -0.39 0.05 -0.16 0.02 0.32 1.29
10 -0.39 0.07 -0.15 0.03 0.46 3.17 -0.39 0.05 -0.16 0.02 0.28 1.15
HS
0 -0.67 0.15 -0.11 0.00 0.00 6.37
2 -0.54 0.61 0.25 0.39 -0.36 20.72 -0.49 0.31 0.06 0.17 -0.61 7.21
3 -0.51 0.33 0.06 0.17 -0.43 12.29 -0.47 0.17 -0.03 0.09 0.02 4.51
4 -0.48 0.22 -0.01 0.10 -0.43 8.71 -0.45 0.14 -0.05 0.06 -2.13 3.24
5 -0.46 0.16 -0.04 0.07 1.87 6.74 -0.44 0.11 -0.08 0.04 -2.98 2.49
6 -0.45 0.13 -0.06 0.06 -1.71 5.50 -0.44 0.08 -0.09 0.03 -17.15 2.02
7 -0.44 0.11 -0.07 0.05 -2.21 4.65 -0.43 0.07 -0.10 0.03 4.67 1.70
8 -0.44 0.09 -0.08 0.04 -3.98 4.02 -0.43 0.06 -0.10 0.02 2.14 1.46
9 -0.43 0.08 -0.09 0.03 -19.35 3.54 -0.43 0.05 -0.11 0.02 1.42 1.29
10 -0.43 0.07 -0.10 0.03 7.45 3.17 -0.43 0.05 -0.11 0.02 1.08 1.15
CL
0 -1.29 0.18 -0.26 0.00 0.00 5.78
2 -1.14 0.73 0.04 0.30 0.27 19.42 -1.06 0.37 -0.12 0.13 3.65 6.55
3 -1.09 0.40 -0.11 0.13 1.10 11.61 -1.04 0.21 -0.20 0.07 0.22 4.14
4 -1.06 0.27 -0.17 0.08 -0.12 8.26 -1.01 0.17 -0.21 0.05 0.74 2.98
5 -1.03 0.20 -0.20 0.06 0.24 6.41 -1.00 0.13 -0.23 0.03 -0.63 2.28
6 -1.02 0.16 -0.22 0.05 1.63 5.24 -0.99 0.10 -0.24 0.03 -0.28 1.85
7 -1.01 0.13 -0.23 0.04 -0.89 4.43 -0.99 0.08 -0.25 0.02 -0.19 1.56
8 -1.00 0.11 -0.24 0.03 -0.41 3.83 -0.99 0.07 -0.25 0.02 -0.15 1.34
9 -0.99 0.10 -0.24 0.03 -0.27 3.38 -0.98 0.06 -0.26 0.02 -0.12 1.18
10 -0.99 0.09 -0.25 0.02 -0.21 3.02 -0.98 0.06 -0.26 0.01 -0.10 1.06
Notes: The elasticity of substitution used in this Table is substantially higher than the elasticity used in
the benchmark runs, namely 0.25. In the expected utility model, elasticity is the inverse of risk aversion
and cannot be fixed independently. See Table 1 for symbols and definitions. An asterisk * means that
the solution is at a point where the utility function is not differentiable (See Section II).44
Table 11: Effects of  Labor Income Risk on Wealth and on Stockholding
When Elasticity of Substitution is Equal to 0.95,
(Less than High School Education)
Kreps-Porteus Model
(KP)
Overweighting of Inferior States
(Y and Q)
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0.25, r r=1-
1/0.95
Parameters:
g g=0.50, l l=0.25, r r=1-
1/0.95












0 -0.044 0.193 0.036 0.000 0.000
2 0.168 -0.072 -0.023 0.037 -0.735 0.214 -0.080 -0.046 0.015 -1.819
3 0.206 -0.048 -0.026 0.020 -1.255 0.246 -0.024 -0.011 0.014 24.020
4 0.233 -0.036 -0.022 0.014 -3.215 0.258 -0.021 -0.012 0.010 0.056
5 0.249 -0.029 -0.018 0.011 3.736 0.265 -0.018 -0.012 0.007 1.705
6 0.260 -0.024 -0.015 0.009 -0.475 0.269 -0.015 -0.011 0.006 0.920
7 0.265 -0.021 -0.013 0.008 2.300 0.271 -0.013 -0.010 0.005 0.671
8 0.269 -0.018 -0.012 0.007 1.206 0.272 -0.011 -0.010 0.004 0.540
9 0.271 -0.016 -0.011 0.006 0.883 0.273 -0.010 -0.010 0.004 0.456
10 0.272 -0.014 -0.011 0.005 0.714 0.274 -0.009 -0.009 0.003 0.397
Notes: See Table 1. In the expected-utility model, elasticity is the inverse of risk aversion and cannot
be fixed independently.45
Table 12: Effects of Departures from Expected-Utility Maximization on Wealth and on Stock holding,





Overweighting of Inferior States
(Y and Q)
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0, r r=-3 3
Parameters:
g g=0.50, l l=0, r r=-3 3


































0 -0.29 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.00 8.22
2 -0.45 0.63 0.30 0.46 -2.59 23.60 -0.41 0.65 0.36 0.49 9.46 25.68 -0.21 0.37 0.29 0.26 0.42 9.47
3 -0.32 0.36 0.19 0.23 0.69 15.14 -0.30 0.37 0.22 0.23 0.60 15.60 -0.16 0.21 0.17 0.13 0.24 5.95
4 -0.24 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.35 11.17 -0.24 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.35 11.17 -0.13 0.17 0.15 0.09 0.17 4.26
5 -0.18 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.23 8.87 -0.20 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.26 8.71 -0.12 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.15 3.28
6 -0.15 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.18 7.36 -0.17 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.23 7.14 -0.11 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.16 2.67
7 -0.12 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.14 6.30 -0.16 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.21 6.05 -0.10 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.17 2.25
8 -0.09 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.11 5.51 -0.14 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.21 5.26 -0.09 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.20 1.95
9 -0.08 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.09 4.90 -0.13 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.22 4.65 -0.09 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.26 1.72
10 -0.06 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.07 4.41 -0.12 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.24 4.17 -0.08 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.36 1.54
HS
0 -0.27 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00 6.37
2 -0.47 0.65 0.34 0.44 -1.20 23.99 -0.43 0.67 0.40 0.47 -5.76 26.16 -0.23 0.39 0.33 0.24 0.36 9.47
3 -0.34 0.38 0.23 0.21 0.75 15.36 -0.32 0.38 0.26 0.22 0.60 15.84 -0.19 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.14 5.93
4 -0.26 0.26 0.20 0.14 0.30 11.30 -0.26 0.26 0.20 0.14 0.30 11.30 -0.16 0.15 0.22 0.12 0.14 6.71
5 -0.21 0.20 0.19 0.10 0.15 8.95 -0.23 0.20 0.17 0.10 0.19 8.78 -0.15 0.13 0.17 0.08 0.07 4.96
6 -0.17 0.16 0.18 0.08 0.07 7.41 -0.20 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.14 7.18 -0.14 0.11 0.17 0.06 0.04 3.87
7 -0.14 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.00 6.33 -0.19 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.11 6.08 -0.13 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.02 3.14
8 -0.12 0.12 0.18 0.06 -0.07 5.53 -0.17 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.09 5.27 -0.12 0.08 0.14 0.04 0.01 2.63
9 -0.11 0.10 0.18 0.05 -0.15 4.91 -0.16 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.08 4.66 -0.12 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.01 2.26
10 -0.09 0.09 0.18 0.04 -0.28 4.42 -0.15 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.07 4.17 -0.11 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.01 1.97
CL
0 -0.65 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.00 5.78
2 -0.97 0.80 0.18 0.36 0.04 23.48 -0.86 0.85 0.27 0.40 -0.17 26.16 -0.60 0.48 0.19 0.20 2.38 9.04
3 -0.77 0.48 0.10 0.18 -0.36 15.30 -0.73 0.49 0.14 0.19 -0.82 15.88 -0.55 0.27 0.09 0.11 0.57 5.70
4 -0.66 0.34 0.08 0.12 3.43 11.34 -0.66 0.34 0.08 0.12 3.43 11.34 -0.52 0.19 0.09 0.11 0.57 4.17
5 -0.58 0.26 0.07 0.09 0.57 9.01 -0.61 0.26 0.05 0.09 0.80 8.82 -0.50 0.17 0.05 0.07 0.43 3.24
6 -0.53 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.36 7.48 -0.58 0.20 0.03 0.07 0.56 7.21 -0.49 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.35 2.62
7 -0.49 0.18 0.07 0.06 0.29 6.40 -0.56 0.17 0.02 0.06 0.53 6.10 -0.48 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.47 2.20
8 -0.46 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.25 5.59 -0.54 0.15 0.02 0.05 0.67 5.29 -0.47 0.10 0.02 0.04 2.19 1.90
9 -0.43 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.23 4.96 -0.53 0.13 0.01 0.04 1.90 4.67 -0.47 0.08 0.01 0.03 -0.43 1.67
10 -0.41 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.21 4.88 -0.52 0.11 0.01 0.04 -0.94 4.19 -0.46 0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.15 1.49
Notes: See Table 1. It is assumed that the size of bequests does not enter the utility function, unlike in our benchmark model. See
Section II.46
Table 13: Effects of  Labor Income Risk on Wealth and on Stockholding
Without a Bequest Motive,





Overweighting of Inferior States
(Y and Q)
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0
Parameters:
g g=1, l l=0, r r=-3 3
Parameters:
g g=0.50, l l=0, r r=-3 3



















0 -0.033 0.193 0.096 0.000 0.000
2 0.123 -0.089 -0.037 0.030 -2.572 0.099 -0.097 -0.043 0.028 9.598 0.143 -0.095 -0.047 0.014 1.192
3 0.126 -0.063 -0.039 0.016 0.934 0.116 -0.065 -0.040 0.016 0.951 0.155 -0.067 -0.040 0.010 1.591
4 0.132 -0.050 -0.035 0.012 0.855 0.132 -0.050 -0.035 0.012 0.855 0.167 -0.027 -0.008 0.010 3.083
5 0.139 -0.041 -0.029 0.010 1.374 0.146 -0.040 -0.028 0.010 0.935 0.175 -0.023 -0.007 0.008 -676.7
6 0.145 -0.035 -0.023 0.008 10.952 0.156 -0.034 -0.023 0.008 1.113 0.181 -0.020 -0.005 0.006 -2.993
7 0.149 -0.030 -0.019 0.007 -1.657 0.164 -0.029 -0.018 0.007 1.425 0.185 -0.017 -0.003 0.006 -1.457
8 0.153 -0.026 -0.015 0.007 -0.772 0.170 -0.025 -0.014 0.007 2.018 0.189 -0.015 -0.001 0.005 -0.915
9 0.157 -0.023 -0.011 0.006 -0.511 0.175 -0.022 -0.011 0.006 3.512 0.191 -0.013 0.000 0.004 -0.603
10 0.160 -0.020 -0.008 0.005 -0.389 0.179 -0.019 -0.009 0.005 14.536 0.193 -0.012 0.001 0.004 -0.338
Notes: See Table 1. It is assumed that the size of bequests does not enter the utility function, unlike in our benchmark model. See
Section II.47
Table 14.  Ratios of Average and Median Financial Net Worth and Stocks to After-tax Labor Income,





g, ñ, ã, ë




























Education: less than high school degree
EU 6, -5, 1, .25 0.03 0.18 0.52 0.13 20 – 29 0.16 0.00 0.25 0.02
Quiggin 9,-3, .15,.25 0.09 0.02 0.34 0.01 30 – 39 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.02
Yaari 0,-3, .15,.25 0.04 0.19 0.52 0.00 40 – 49 0.88 0.36 0.90 0.37
50 – 59 0.61 0.12 0.61 0.14
Education:  high school degree
EU 8, -7, 1, .25 0.07 0.13 0.54 0.08 20 – 29 0.26 0.02 0.33 0.05
Quiggin 6,-5
2/3,.5,.25 0.10 0.12 0.54 0.08 30 – 39 0.36 0.04 0.46 0.13
Yaari 0,-5
2/3,.5,.25 0.01 0.15 0.54 0.00 40 – 49 0.90 0.50 1.07 0.63
50 – 59 1.72 0.73 2.04 1.09
Education:  college degree
EU 4, -3, 1, .25 -0.43 0.38 0.41 0.17 20 – 29 0.66 0.37 0.78 0.41
Quiggin 3, -9, .7, .25 -0.23 0.44 0.63 0.23 30 – 39 0.63 0.35 0.77 0.45
Yaari 0, -9, .7, .25 -0.24 0.18 0.45 0.00 40 – 49 1.51 0.55 1.81 0.74
50 – 59 2.33 0.84 2.97 1.42
Data Source: 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances, and Bertaut and Haliassos (1997).
Notes: See Table 1.
W/Y and S/Y: model predictions for wealth- and stock-to-income ratios. Second period figures refer to expected asset-to-
income ratios based on period 1 information. W
d:  Directly held financial net worth.  S
d: Directly held stocks. Y: After-tax
labor income. Directly held stocks include shares of publicly traded stocks, shares in mutual stock funds, and stocks in IRAs
and Keoghs. Directly held financial net worth includes directly held stocks, checking, saving, money market, and call accounts,
CDs, saving and other bonds, and the cash value of life insurance, minus balances on credit cards, consumer loans, and other
non-real estate loans.  W
b:  Directly and indirectly held financial net worth  S
b:  Directly and indirectly held stocks. Directly
and indirectly held stocks include all directly held stocks, plus stocks held in defined contribution pension plans, trusts, and
managed investment accounts. Directly and indirectly held household financial net worth includes directly held financial net
worth, plus assets held in defined contribution pension plans, trusts, and managed investment accounts. W
d/Y and W
b/Y: Ratio
of average financial net worth in age-education cell to average after-tax labor income in age-education cell. S
d/Y and S
b/Y:
Ratio of average stocks to average after-tax labor income.49
                                                                                                                                      
14 In Table 1, the EU framework understates the sensitivity of stockholding to risk aversion in both periods, relative to
the KP framework where elasticity remains unchanged. Comparison with Table 10 shows that this finding is not
robust to high elasticity values.
15 For example, if we vary risk aversion from 2 to 10 and we consider the Quiggin specification for benchmark
values of ã=0.50 and ñ=-3, but double the size of ë to 0.5, then the corresponding ranges of first-period wealth-
to-income ratios of the three education classes are -0.04 to 0.08; -0.06 to 0.05; and -0.36 to -0.23 respectively.
These are very close to the ranges reported in the last set of columns of Table 1 where ë is only equal to 0.25.
16 This extends an observation made in Bertaut and Haliassos (1997) which was derived only for expected utility models.
17 In the 1992 SCF, for example, the percentages of those refusing to undertake any financial risk in the three
education categories (starting with high school dropouts) are 78%, 52%, and 27% respectively.